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Abstract 
 
This research examines how moral values regulate the behavior of individual group 
members. We argue that group members behave in line with moral group norms because they 
anticipate receiving ingroup respect when enacting moral values that are shared by ingroup 
members. Data from two experimental studies offer evidence in support. In Study 1 (N = 82) 
morality-based (but not competence-based) ingroup norms determined whether members of a 
low status group opted for individual versus collective strategies for status improvement. This 
effect was mediated by anticipated ingroup respect, and emerged regardless of whether group 
norms prescribed collectivistic or individualistic behavior. We replicated these effects in 
Study 2 (N = 69), where no comparable effect was found as a result of moral norms 
communicated by a higher status outgroup. This indicates that social identity implications 
rather than interdependence or more generic concerns about social approval or importance of 
cooperation drive these effects.  
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Sharing moral values: Anticipated ingroup respect as a determinant  
of adherence to morality-based (but not competence-based) group norms 
 
Morality has been defined as the evaluation of the “actions or character of a person 
that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” 
(Haidt, 2001, p.817). Accordingly, people in different social groups or cultures may endorse 
different moral values, such as autonomy vs. duty in individualist vs. collectivist cultures. 
Nevertheless, researchers in this area have primarily examined moral values that tend to be 
universal across groups and cultures (such as fairness, Haidt, 2001). Additionally, they have 
mainly addressed individual decision making in moral dilemmas (Turiel, 2006), whereas the 
social identity implications of moral behavior have not been explicitly examined so far. In 
fact, researchers of group processes and intergroup relations rarely focus on moral aspects of 
the phenomena they investigate, even though these may be quite relevant for instance in 
research on ingroup-outgroup biases (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006). Our current aim 
therefore is to connect these two literatures, as we examine the impact of moral values shared 
by the ingroup on the behavior of individual group members. We report two studies that 
compare different types of normative moral values shared by the ingroup, to competence-
based group norms (Study 1), and to moral norms endorsed by members of a higher status 
outgroup (Study 2). We assess how moral values shared by the ingroup (rather than 
competence norms or outgroup values) affect the behavior of individual group members, and 
address the psychological process underlying these effects (Study 1 and Study 2). 
 
Social Identity and the Importance of Shared Moral Values 
The current investigation focuses on the social aspects and identity implications of shared 
moral values. The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes that membership 
in social groups can help individuals define who they are, where they belong, and how they 
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should behave. In this perspective, social groups affect individual behavior, not only because 
of interdependence and instrumentality concerns, but primarily for more abstract meaning 
seeking and social distinctiveness reasons (Turner, 1991). 
Recent research has revealed that moral behavior can be an important source of group 
pride and ingroup identification. Across a variety of groups in different cultural contexts, 
people’s judgments of their group in terms of its morality were found to be even more 
important in this sense than evaluative judgments of the group based on its competence or 
sociability, irrespective of (high vs. low) group status or group type (Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007). When group members were asked to describe their identity, they often 
referred to shared values as being important to their social identity, and indicated this was a 
more important guide for their individual behavior than were aspects of their personal 
identity (Bettencourt & Hume, 1999). Other researchers have also proposed that normative 
expressions of morality at the group level may function as a situational cue that determines 
the moral behavior of individuals (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009).  
 Group norms have been defined as an “accepted way of thinking, feeling or behaving 
that is endorsed and expected because it is perceived as the right and proper thing to do” 
(Turner, 1991, p. 3; ‘injunctive norms’, Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Accordingly, adherence 
to group norms can earn respect from other ingroup members, as it demonstrates one is a 
‘good’ group member, who is willing to let go of individual behavioral preferences in order 
to behave in ways that are approved by the group (see for instance, Barreto & Ellemers, 2000; 
Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Sherif, 1966). Competence vs. ‘warmth’ are often 
considered as central dimensions of social value (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). However, judgments of ‘warmth’ – as 
considered in previous research, e.g., Wojciszke, 2005  – encompass perceived sociability as 
well as morality and recent evidence shows that of these two, morality judgments tend to be 
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most important in judging the behavior of other ingroup members (Leach et al., 2007). This is 
why we distinguish between competence and morality as two central dimensions underlying 
the judgments people make about themselves and others, both at the individual and at the 
group level (see also De Bruin & Van Lange 2000; Phallet & Poppe, 1997; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Group norms - as well as the evaluation of 
those who behave in line with or transgress these norms - can also be defined either in terms 
of the perceived competence of those who display group normative behavior, or in terms of 
the perceived morality of such behavior (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). 
 
Adherence to Moral Norms and Ingroup Respect 
Within social groups there is greater pressure to be moral than to be competent as 
diverse moral values are more problematic for groups than diverse competencies. The 
presence of people with different competences within the same group tends to be accepted, as 
in the case of new or less experienced group members (Rink & Ellemers, 2009), or may even 
be valued as their different abilities constitute a potential source of innovation and change 
(Ellemers & Rink, 2005). However, when members of the same group differ from each other 
in terms of moral values this is more problematic. Moral issues tend to be seen as self-
evident, objective and non-negotiable (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997), causing lack of tolerance for 
those who endorse different moral values (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Turiel, 1983). 
Accordingly, moral value differences have been found to reduce the desire for social 
interaction (Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). 
Indeed, people tend to experience intense negative emotions (such as disgust and contempt) 
towards those who endorse different moral values, and may even feel justified to display 
aggressive behavior against them (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2003). 
Moreover, research on trust violations suggests that people should be more concerned about 
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the violation of moral norms (e.g., that call into question their integrity) than about violating 
competence-based norms (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & 
Dirks, 2007). 
As a result, we propose that transgression of moral norms tends to be seen as more 
socially consequential than transgression of competence-based norms (see also Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987). We argue that moral values represent a more powerful basis for social norms 
than competence-based norms because they are perceived to have more profound social 
identity implications (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fisher, 2002; Schwartz, 
1992). Because of the lack of tolerance for differences in moral values, those who violate 
shared moral values are likely to anticipate social sanctions, such as ridicule or ostracism 
(Fry, 2006). Conversely, enacting moral norms may be seen as a way to earn respect and 
acceptance from other ingroup members, which is relevant to feelings of inclusion and self-
esteem (Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; see 
also Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). 
Even though shared norms that help define a group identity can refer to competence-
related attributes as well, we think that norms that are based on competence judgments are 
less likely to have such far-reaching implications for people’s sense of self and social 
identity. First, this is the case because – as argued above – competence differences are 
generally considered less problematic than differences in moral values. Second, people are 
quite aware of how others perceive their moral behavior, and are less likely to consider how 
others regard their competence (Wojciszke, 1994), regardless of their status in society 
(Ellemers et al., 2008). Indeed, ingroup respect based on superior competence had relatively 
little impact on the tendency to see the self as a good group member (Spears, Ellemers, & 
Doosje, 2005).  
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Our main proposition thus is that people tend to enact moral group norms (rather than 
competence norms) as they see this as a way to earn respect from other ingroup members. 
This implies that moral norms should be particularly relevant as a guideline for individual 
behavior when they represent moral values that are shared by other ingroup members. This 
counters a more generic individual-level perspective according to which any source 
expressing a behavioral norm with reference to morality judgments might be able to induce 
people to behave in line with this norm. We argue that norms referring to moral values shared 
by the ingroup are most likely to have this effect. People will be less inclined to behave in 
line with moral norms deriving from values shared by members of an outgroup (see also 
Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009) because this is seen as less consequential for the respect that can 
be earned from other ingroup members (see also Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004; Huo, 
Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Due to these differential social identity implications, we predict 
that the impact of moral norms is group-specific. Moral norms conveyed by an outgroup 
should have less of an impact on individual behavior than moral ingroup norms.  
 
The Consensual Definition of Moral Behavior 
Previous research examined competence vs. morality judgments with reference to 
different types of behavior. For instance, competitive choices have been seen as indicative of 
individual competence, whereas cooperative displays are seen to convey morality (e.g., Van 
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Indeed, the willingness to consider other people’s outcomes in the 
allocation of resources is generally seen as indicating morality (De Bruin & Van Lange, 
2000; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; see also Judd, et al., 2005; Wojciszke, 2005). 
We do not wish to deny that in practice moral norms more often than not refer to 
cooperation and altruism as universally shared values. Nevertheless, we argue that the 
importance of morality-based norms stems more specifically from the desire to adhere to 
Moral Group Norms 
 
8 
 
moral values shared by the ingroup, and the social identity implications of doing so (see also 
Jetten et al., 2002). If this is indeed the case, behaving in line with morality-based norms 
should be independent of the specific behavior prescribed by these norms. If adhering to 
shared ingroup values helps individuals define their distinct group identity because they 
anticipate respect from other ingroup members by doing so, we should be able to observe 
these effects regardless of whether shared group values prescribe individualistic or 
collectivistic behavior. 
In sum, we aim to demonstrate that the consensus within the ingroup about what is 
morally appropriate is decisive, and adherence to moral norms does not depend on the 
specific nature of the behavior prescribed. The processes we wish to examine stem from 
group-based social identities, not a generic desire for social approval or long term exchange 
or instrumentality. This is why we also argue that moral norms expressed by an outgroup are 
less likely to have these effects. This should be the case even when the outgroup has higher 
status than the ingroup, and even when outgroup approval or disapproval of one’s actions 
may be instrumentally relevant to the anticipated success of these actions.  
 
Overview of the Present Research 
Based on relevant theory and previous research we predict that people will be more 
inclined to behave in line with morality-based ingroup norms than to adapt their behavior to 
competence-based ingroup norms (Hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, we anticipate the greater 
impact of moral group norms (vs. competence norms) to be visible regardless of the 
individualistic vs. collectivistic behavior prescribed by these norms (Hypothesis 1b). We 
further predict that enacting moral ingroup norms leads individuals to anticipate receiving 
ingroup respect (Hypothesis 2a), and that the anticipation of ingroup respect mediates the 
effect of moral ingroup norms on individual behavioral choices (Hypothesis 2b). The effect of 
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moral norms on anticipated respect (Hypothesis 3a) and on individual behavior (Hypothesis 
3b) is predicted to be less pronounced when moral norms refer to values shared by an 
outgroup.  
 We present two studies to test these predictions. We focus on members of a group 
with low societal status in the focal comparison context (inhabitants of Southern vs. Northern 
Italy; see Capozza, Bonaldo, & Di Maggio, 1982), as this allows us to assess different 
behavioral strategies group members can adopt to achieve position improvement (individual 
vs. collective status improvement). Previous research in which low status vs. high status 
groups were compared established that group status does not affect the perceived importance 
of morality over competence (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007).  
In Study 1, the effects of morality versus competence based ingroup norms are 
compared, to confirm that moral norms have a stronger effect on the behavioral choices of 
individual group members (H1a), regardless of whether these norms prescribe individual or 
collective status improvement (H1b), indicating that moral behavior does not coincide with a 
group-based choice but rather reflects adherence to moral prescription. In this study we also 
examine whether this effect is mediated by anticipated ingroup respect (H2a and 2b). In 
Study 2, we compare the effects of moral norms endorsed by the low-status ingroup 
(inhabitants of Southern Italy) versus moral norms conveyed by the high-status outgroup 
(inhabitants of Northern Italy). This enables us to further examine whether the effects of 
moral group norms are indeed due to their reference to shared ingroup values, and the impact 
of behaving in line with such values on anticipated ingroup respect (H3a and 3b). Comparing 
the impact of (low status) ingroup vs. (high status) outgroup norms allows us to exclude that 
the predicted effects stem from a more generic desire to adhere to moral norms. This provides 
a strong test of our predictions, as we argue that the norms of the outgroup should be less 
effective despite the superior social standing of this group.   
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Study 1 
Method 
Design and participants. The design of the study was a 2 (Competence Norm:  Smart 
vs. Stupid evaluation of collective vs. individual strategies) X 2 (Morality Norm: Moral vs. 
Immoral evaluation of collective vs. individual strategies) between participants.   
A total of 82 students from the University of Chieti-Pescara took part in this 
experiment (67 women and 15 men; evenly distributed across conditions). Their mean age 
was 21.56 (SD = 5.16). Between 19 and 22 participants filled each of the four cells of the 
design. Each session lasted approximately half an hour, after which participants were thanked 
and fully debriefed.  
Procedure.  
Participants were recruited during a Psychology class and asked to anonymously 
answer a paper-and-pencil questionnaire concerning employment in the South of Italy. 
Following the procedure developed by Ellemers et al. (2008; Study 3), in the introduction it 
was stated that the Italian Government was conducting a survey to better understand the 
opinion of Southerners regarding these issues. Participants were then asked to indicate in 
which part of Italy they were born (South Italy; Middle-South Italy; Middle-North Italy; 
North Italy). Since all participants declared they were born either in the South or Middle-
South of Italy, they were all included in the analyses.  
At this stage, ingroup identification was measured, by means of four items (e.g., 
“Being from the South is important to me”; see Barreto & Ellemers, 2000;)” scale ranging 
from 1 = totally disagree to 9 = totally agree; M = 6.08; SD = 1.79; α = .82). A one-way 
Analysis of Variance showed that identification was equal across conditions, F (3,78) = 0.49, 
ns. Additionally, when ingroup identification was included as a covariate in subsequent 
analyses, this did not change the pattern of results. Thus, the effects of our manipulations on 
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participants’ responses cannot be ascribed to differences between conditions in ingroup 
identification.  
Reinforcement of low-status. Participants read that a previous survey conducted by the 
National Institute for Statistics in 2006-2007 to compare the current occupational 
opportunities in different areas of Italy, had demonstrated that the economical situation was 
very different in the (Middle-)South of Italy, compared to the (Middle-)North. Thus, the 
ingroup was presented as having relatively low status, by referring to a specific comparison 
outgroup (i.e., Northern Italians) in terms of a specific comparative domain (employment 
opportunities). Participants read that the previous survey highlighted two different ways in 
which people tried to deal with this difference in opportunities. One was to find a way to 
improve one’s personal position or prospects, despite being from the South (individual status 
improvement). Alternatively, people could try to address this difference in opportunities 
between people living in the South and in the North more generally (collective status 
improvement). Examples of different courses of actions were provided, to further illustrate 
how these two types of strategies differed from each other. Participants also read that, as time 
and effort are limited, these two types of strategies tend to be incompatible with each other: 
investing in collective status improvement would likely imply that less energy and resources 
are available for individual status improvement, and vice versa (see Appendix A).  
Manipulation of group norms. Participants were asked to evaluate these two competing 
strategies, both in terms of morality and in terms of competence. This was done to emphasize 
these as the two focal dimensions of evaluation, to be able to credibly introduce the group 
norm manipulation at a later stage, and to control for participants’ own a priori evaluations of 
each of these strategies, when examining the effects of the group norm manipulations. 
Participants evaluated these strategies on scales ranging from 1 (= absolutely 
stupid/absolutely immoral) to 9 (= absolutely smart/absolutely moral). When these a priori 
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evaluations of individual and collective strategies in terms of morality and competence were 
included as covariates in further analyses, this did not affect the results obtained. After 
participants had completed their own ratings, they were provided with bogus feedback about 
the evaluation of collective (vs. individual) strategies by other ingroup members, allegedly as 
resulting from the previous survey.  
Morality Norm was manipulated by providing participants with bogus feedback about 
the evaluation of these strategies in terms of morality. In the moral condition, participants 
read that the majority of previously interviewed Southerners (i.e., ingroup members) had 
declared that of the two types of strategies, trying to advance the position of one’s group is 
the more moral way to act compared to individual advancement. To enhance credibility of 
our manipulation, this evaluation was further explained with reference to justice as a central 
aspect of morality (Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010; Leach et al., 2007). 
Specifically, it was noted that group position improvement represents a more appropriate way 
to ensure just outcomes for everybody. By contrast, in the immoral condition they were told 
that the other ingroup members had declared that trying to advance the position of one’s 
group is an immoral way to act (compared to individual advancement). This position was 
further clarified by pointing out that collective level measures are less likely to ensure just 
outcomes for everybody. 
Competence Norm was manipulated by providing participants with bogus feedback 
about the evaluation of these strategies in terms of competence. In the smart condition, 
participants read that the majority of previously interviewed Southerners (i.e., ingroup 
members) had declared that trying to advance the position of one’s group is a smarter strategy 
than individual position improvement. The rationale provided for this evaluation was derived 
from conceptualizations of competence as individual efficiency or rationality (De Bruin & 
Van Lange, 2000; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Wojciszke, 2005). That is, it was explained 
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by noting that compared to individual advancement, collective position improvement is a 
more efficient way to improve outcomes for several group members at the same time. By 
contrast, in the stupid condition they were told that the other ingroup members had declared 
that trying to advance the position of one’s group is a stupid strategy. This was further 
clarified by stating that collective position improvement is a less efficient way to improve 
outcomes for individual group members. These manipulations were subsequently checked by 
asking participants to recall which strategy was favored by other ingroup members in terms 
of morality and competence (from 1 = individual to 9 = collective strategy). 
Dependent variables. Anticipated ingroup respect was assessed by asking participants to 
indicate how they anticipated other members of their group to react when they opted for the 
normative (vs. counter-normative) strategy. In line with definitions of respect as indicating 
inclusion and value (Sleebos et al., 2006; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992), we 
asked participants to provide their responses on eight bipolar scales (“I think that they would: 
Disregard me-Regard me; Not value me-Value me; Exclude me-Include me; Reject me-
Accept me; Shun me-Welcome me; Avoid me-Approach me; Ignore me-Appreciate me; 
Isolate me-Involve me”; α = .97). 
Willingness to invest in collective status improvement was assessed by asking 
participants to indicate to what extent they would themselves engage in each of six specific 
status improvement strategies that might help advance the position of their group (e.g. 
“Develop an employment program for the Middle-South”; see Appendix B), on a scale 
ranging from 1 (= Absolutely not) to 9 (= Absolutely). Their responses were averaged to 
construct a single measure indicating participants’ willingness to invest in collective status 
improvement (α = .93). 
Willingness to invest in individual status improvement was assessed by asking 
participants to indicate to what extent they would engage in each of four specific strategies 
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for individual status improvement (e.g. “Move to the North”; see Appendix B) on a scale 
ranging from 1 (= Absolutely not) to 9 (= Absolutely). Their responses were averaged to 
construct a single measure indicating participants’ willingness to invest in individual status 
improvement (α = .65). 
Bipolar choice of strategy was assessed after measuring intentions to invest in specific 
individual and collective strategies. We emphasized that different types of strategies tend to 
be incompatible due to limited time and energy, so that in practice pursuing one type of 
strategy would likely go at the expense of the other. We then asked participants to indicate on 
a bipolar scale which one of these two types of strategies they would prefer if they had to 
choose one at the expense of the other (from 1 = my own position to 9 = the position of the 
South as a whole). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks.  
As intended, analyzes of the manipulation checks indicated that both norm manipulations 
were effective. As a result of the Moral Norm manipulation, participants indicated that other 
ingroup members had evaluated collective status improvement as more moral in the moral 
condition (M = 6.37; SD = 2.76) than in the immoral condition (M = 3.43; SD = 2.66), 
F(1,80) = 24.13, p < .001, partial η2 = .23. In response to the Competence Norm 
manipulation, participants declared that other ingroup members had evaluated collective 
status improvement as smarter in the smart condition (M = 6.51; SD = 2.45) than in the stupid 
condition (M = 3.55; SD = 2.62), F (1,80) = 27.56, p < .001, partial η2 = .26.  
Importantly, we tested whether each of these manipulations only influenced the focal 
check, and not the other, in order to rule out the possibility that the norm defined in terms of 
morality may have influenced inferred evaluations in terms of competence, and vice versa. 
This test confirmed that each manipulation only affected the intended check, and there was 
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no significant interaction between the two factors. With regard to the competence norm 
manipulation check, neither the effect of morality norm, F(1,78) = 0.94, p = .739, nor the 
interaction, F(1,78) = 0.94, p = .742, were significant. In the same vein, with regard to the 
morality norm manipulation check, neither the effect of competence norm, F (1,78) = 1.06, p 
= .543, nor the interaction, F(1,78) = 0.11, p = .973, were significant. 
Dependent variables. To test our predictions, we performed a 2 Competence Norm (Smart 
vs. Stupid evaluation of collective strategies) X 2 Morality Norm (Moral vs. Immoral 
evaluation of collective strategies) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for each dependent 
variable
1
.  
Willingness to invest in collective status improvement. The ANOVA only revealed a main 
effect of Morality Norm, F(1,78) = 25.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .25, in line with Hypothesis 
1a. The relevant means indicate that participants were more willing to invest in collective 
status improvement strategies when this  was valued as moral by other ingroup members (M 
= 6.98; SD = 1.59) than when the group had described collective status improvement as 
immoral (M = 4.86; SD = 2.19). Neither the main effect of Competence Norm, F(1,78) = 
0.008, p = .93, nor the interaction, F(1,78) = 2.19, p = .145, were significant. 
Willingness to invest in individual status improvement. For this measure too, the ANOVA 
only revealed a main effect of Morality Norm, F(1,78) = 10.98, p = .001, partial η2 = .12, as 
predicted in Hypothesis 1b. Participants were more willing to invest in individual strategies 
for status improvement when this was valued as moral by other ingroup members (M = 6.98; 
SD = 1.59) than when the group indicated that individual status improvement was immoral 
(M = 4.86; SD = 2.19). Neither the main effect of Competence Norm, F(1,78) = 0.21, p = 
.648, nor the interaction, F(1,78) = 0.32, p = .575, were significant.  
Bipolar choice of strategy. When participants were asked to choose between individual vs. 
collective status improvement, results again supported predictions made in Hypothesis 1. The 
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ANOVA only revealed a significant main effect of Morality Norm, F(1,78) = 7.79, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .09. This effect indicates that participants were more inclined to choose collective 
status improvement—at the expense of individual status improvement—when  this was 
considered the more moral course of action (M = 4.90; SD = 3.01), compared to when the 
ingroup considered this immoral (M = 3.21; SD = 2.34). Again, neither the main effect of 
Competence Norm, F(1,78) = 0.48, p = .491, nor the interaction, F(1,78) = 0.14, p = .708, 
were significant.  
Anticipated ingroup respect. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Morality Norm, 
F(1,78) = 38.21, p < .001, partial η2 = .33. In line with Hypothesis 2a, participants anticipated 
more ingroup respect when they would opt for the strategy that was considered moral by 
other ingroup members (M = 6.05; SD = 2.17) than when they would adopt the strategy that 
was considered immoral (M = 3.29; SD = 1.81). Behaving in line with a competence-based 
norm was not seen as consequential for the amount of ingroup respect anticipated. That is, 
neither the main effect of Competence Norm, F (1,78) = 0.14, p = .814, nor the interaction, F 
(1,78) = 0.01, p = .984, were significant.  
 Mediation analyses. Mediation analyses were conducted with the stepwise regression 
approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986), to examine the prediction that anticipated ingroup respect 
mediates the relation between morality norms and choice of behavioral strategy. 
 Collective Strategies: As also observed in the ANOVA’s reported above, Morality 
Norm (-1 = immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted willingness to invest in collective 
strategies (β = .49, p < .001) as well as anticipated ingroup respect (β = .57, p < .001). 
Additionally, anticipated ingroup respect reliably predicted participants’ willingness to invest 
in collective strategies, β = .61, p < .001. When Morality Norm and anticipated ingroup 
respect were entered simultaneously as predictors of willingness to invest in collective 
strategies, the effect of anticipated ingroup respect was retained (β = .49, p < .001) while the 
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direct effect of Morality Norm was no longer reliable (β = .19, p = .084; Sobel test: z = 4.64, 
p < .001)
2
. This indicates that the effects of morality-based ingroup norms on participants’ 
willingness to invest in collective strategies were fully mediated by anticipated ingroup 
respect, as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. 
 Individual  Strategies: Consistent with results from the ANOVA’s reported above, 
Morality Norm (-1 = immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted both the willingness to 
invest in individual strategies (β = .35, p = .01) and anticipated ingroup respect (β = .57, p < 
.001). Furthermore, anticipated ingroup respect reliably predicted participants’ willingness to 
invest in individual strategies, β = -.49, p < .001. Finally, when Morality Norm and 
anticipated ingroup respect were entered simultaneously as predictors, the effect of 
anticipated ingroup respect was retained (β = -.42, p < .001) while the direct effect of 
Morality Norm was no longer reliable (β = .11, p = .357; Sobel test: z = 4.63, p < .001). This 
indicates that the effect of morality-based ingroup norms on participants’ willingness to 
invest in individual strategies was also fully mediated by anticipated ingroup respect, which 
further supports Hypothesis 2b. 
 Bipolar Choice: In line with ANOVA results reported above, Morality Norm (-1 = 
immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted both the bipolar choice of strategy (β = .30, p = 
.01) and anticipated ingroup respect (β = .57, p < .001). Furthermore, anticipated ingroup 
respect reliably predicted participants’ bipolar strategy choice, β = .59, p < .001. Finally, 
when Morality Norm and anticipated ingroup respect were simultaneously entered as 
predictors, the effect of anticipated ingroup respect on bipolar choice of strategy was retained 
(β = .62, p < .001) while the direct effect of Morality Norm was no longer reliable (β = -.05, p 
= .652; Sobel test: z = 4.50, p < .001). Thus, as predicted, the effect of morality-based 
ingroup norms on participants’ bipolar choice of collective vs. individual strategies was fully 
mediated by the level of ingroup respect they anticipated to receive when adhering to the 
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moral norm, as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. 
Study 2 
Study 2 examined whether the tendency to behave in line with moral norms is 
generic, or should be ascribed to group-specific identity concerns. In this study we focus on 
moral norms only. Participants were simultaneously presented with ingroup (South of Italy) 
as well as outgroup (North of Italy) norms, with both groups either advocating the same 
strategy or ingroup and outgroup norms stating opposing preferences, depending on 
experimental conditions. In line with our rationale, we expected only moral ingroup norms to 
affect group members’ behavior – regardless of whether or not the outgroup approved of this 
strategy - and this effect should be mediated by anticipated ingroup respect.  
Method 
Design and participants. In this study, we adopted a 2 (Ingroup Norm: Moral vs. 
Immoral evaluation of collective strategies) X 2 (Outgroup Norm: Moral vs. Immoral 
evaluation of collective strategies) between participants design. Participants received 
information about ingroup as well as outgroup norms that were both defined in terms of 
moral judgments.  
A total of 69 students from the University of Chieti-Pescara took part in this 
experiment (46 women, 19 men, 4 unknown; evenly distributed across conditions). Their 
mean age was 22.08 (SD = 4.68). Between 17 and 18 participants filled each of the four cells 
of the design. Each session lasted approximately half an hour, after which participants were 
thanked and fully debriefed.  
Procedure and measures. Participants were recruited during a Psychology class. As in 
Study1, they were informed about the fictitious results of a previous survey, indicating the 
ingroup (i.e., Middle-South of Italy) as having relatively low status, by referring to a specific 
comparison outgroup (i.e., Northern Italians) in terms of a employment opportunities. They 
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were then presented simultaneously with ingroup (South of Italy) as well as outgroup (North 
of Italy) morality-based norms. Ingroup Norm was manipulated by providing participants 
with bogus feedback about the evaluation of collective (vs. individual) strategies in terms of 
morality, as in Study 1. Outgroup Norm was manipulated in the same way, only the 
evaluations of collective (compared to individual) status improvement strategies allegedly 
were provided by a sample of previously interviewed Northerners–representing the high 
status outgroup relevant in this context. 
These manipulations were checked with two questions, asking participants to recall 
which type of strategy had been evaluated as more moral by other Southerners (the ingroup) 
and other Northerners (the outgroup) on a bipolar scale (1 = individual to 9 = collective). 
Ingroup identification was assessed as in Study 1 (M = 5.99; SD = 1.74; α = .83). Again, a 
one-way ANOVA showed that identification was equal across conditions, F (3,64) = 0.55, p 
= .638, and including ingroup identification as a covariate did not change the results. Thus, 
effects of our manipulations cannot be attributed to differences between conditions in ingroup 
identification. Anticipated ingroup respect (α = .96), Willingness to invest in collective status 
improvement (α = .86), Willingness to invest in individual status improvement (α = .73), and 
the bipolar choice measure were assessed with the same items as in Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. Both manipulations were successful. As a result of the Ingroup 
Norm manipulation, participants indicated that other ingroup members evaluated collective 
status improvement as more moral in the moral condition (M = 7.18; SD = 2.26) than in the 
immoral condition (M = 3.51; SD = 2.62), F (1,67) = 38.58, p < .001, η2 = .37. Similarly, the 
Outgroup Norm manipulation caused participants to indicate that outgroup members 
evaluated collective status improvement as more moral in the moral condition (M = 6.03; SD 
= 2.63) than in the immoral condition (M = 2.76; SD = 1.89), F (1,67) = 34.86, p < .001, η2 = 
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.34. Importantly, the effect size was equal in both cases. Furthermore, we were able to rule 
out that the ingroup norm manipulation influenced the perceived evaluation of these 
strategies by the outgroup and vice versa. That is, each manipulation only affected the 
intended check, and there was no significant interaction between the two factors. With regard 
to the ingroup norm manipulation check, neither the effect of outgroup norm, F (1,65) = 2.12, 
p = .15, nor the interaction, F (1,65) = 0.12, p = .734, were significant. Similarly, with regard 
to the outgroup norm manipulation check, neither the effect of ingroup norm, F (1,65) = 1.75, 
p = .191,nor the interaction, F (1,65) = 0.35, p = .554,were significant. 
Dependent variables. We performed a 2 (Ingroup Norm: Moral vs. Immoral 
evaluation of collective strategies) X 2 (Outgroup Norm: Moral vs. Immoral evaluation of 
collective strategies) for each dependent variable.  
Willingness to invest in collective status improvement. A main effect of Ingroup Norm was 
observed, F(1,65) = 152.24, p < .001, partial η2 = .70, indicating that participants were more 
willing to invest in collective strategies for status improvement when collective status 
improvement was valued as moral by other ingroup members (M = 7.86; SD = 0.75) than 
when the ingroup indicated this was immoral (M = 4.51; SD = 1.46). The main effect of 
Outgroup Norm was not significant, F(1,65) = 1.96, p = .19, indicating that moral evaluations 
by outgroup members did not affect participants’ willingness to engage in collective status 
improvement strategies. This is in line with Hypothesis 3b. The two-way interaction was not 
reliable, F(1,65) = 4.00, p = .068.
3
 
Willingness to invest in individual status improvement. We found a main effect of 
Ingroup Norm, F (1,65) = 14.37, p < .001, partial η2 = .18, revealing that participants were 
more willing to invest in individual strategies for status improvement when individual status 
improvement was valued as the more moral strategy by other ingroup members (M = 7.46; 
SD = 1.06) than when the ingroup characterized this as immoral (M = 6.12; SD = 1.76). 
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Neither the main effect of Outgroup Norm, F (1,65) = 0.72, p = .929, nor the interaction, F 
(1,65) = 0.91, p = .722, were significant, providing further support for Hypothesis 3b. 
Bipolar choice of strategy. Participants’ choices between collective vs. individual status 
improvement only revealed a significant main effect of Ingroup Norm, F (1,65) = 30.77, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .32. The relevant means indicate that participants were more likely to opt 
for collective status improvement when this was valued as moral by other ingroup members 
(M = 6.03; SD = 2.97) compared to when the ingroup considered this immoral (M = 2.77; SD 
= 1.75). Again, neither the main effect of Outgroup Norm, F (1,65) = 1.09, p = .292, nor the 
interaction, F (1,78) = 0.03, p = .697, were significant, in line with predictions in Hypothesis 
3b. 
Anticipated ingroup respect.  
For this dependent variable we found a significant effect of Ingroup Norm, F (1,65) = 197.22, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .75. As predicted in Hypothesis 3a, the relevant means indicate that 
participants anticipated more ingroup respect when they would engage in the strategy that 
was valued as more moral (M = 6.98; SD = 1.39) rather than immoral (M = 2.71; SD = 1.12) 
by other ingroup members. Therefore, as in Study 1 and in line with predictions, participants 
thought they would receive more ingroup respect if they behaved in line with the moral 
ingroup norm. Neither the main effect of Outgroup Norm, F (1,65) = 0.70, p = .388, nor the 
interaction, F (1,65) = 1.10, p = .822, were significant, as anticipated. 
Mediation analyses. Mediation analyses were conducted with the stepwise regression 
approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986), to examine the prediction that anticipated ingroup respect 
mediates the relation between morality norms and choice of behavioral strategy. 
Collective Strategies: As also observed in the ANOVA’s reported above, Ingroup 
Norm (-1 = immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted both the willingness to invest in 
collective strategies (β = .83, p < .001) and anticipated ingroup respect (β = .86, p < .001). 
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Furthermore, anticipated ingroup respect reliably predicted participants’ willingness to invest 
in collective strategies, β = .79, p < .001. When Ingroup Norm and anticipated ingroup 
respect were entered simultaneously as predictors, both the effect of anticipated respect (β = 
.30, p < .001) and the effect of Ingroup Norm were retained (β = .57, p < .001). However, a 
Sobel test confirmed that there also was a significant indirect effect of ingroup norm on 
willingness to invest in collective strategies through anticipated respect (z = 8.39, p < .001). 
This offers evidence for partial mediation, and indicates that the morality-based ingroup norm 
affects the endorsement of collective strategies not only directly, but also through a reliable 
indirect effect mediated by anticipated ingroup respect.  
Individual Strategies: In line with results of the ANOVA’s reported above, Ingroup 
Norm (-1 = immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted both the willingness to invest in 
individual strategies (β = -.43, p < .001) and anticipated ingroup respect (β = .86, p < .001). 
Furthermore, anticipated ingroup respect reliably predicted participants’ willingness to invest 
in individual strategies, β = -.55, p < .001. Finally, when Ingroup Norm and anticipated 
ingroup respect were simultaneously entered as predictors, the effect of anticipated ingroup 
respect remained significant (β = -.70, p < .001) while the direct effect of Ingroup Norm was 
no longer reliable (β = .18, p = .372; Sobel test: z = -5.00, p < .001). This indicates that the 
effect of morality-based ingroup norms on participants’ willingness to invest in individual 
strategies was fully mediated by anticipated ingroup respect, as predicted. 
 Bipolar choice of strategy: In line with the ANOVA’s reported above, Ingroup Norm 
(-1 = immoral; 1 = moral) significantly predicted both the bipolar choice of strategy (β = .56, 
p < .001) and anticipated ingroup respect (β = .86, p < .001). Furthermore, anticipated 
ingroup respect reliably predicted participants’ bipolar strategy choice, β = .61, p < .001. 
Finally, when Ingroup Norm and anticipated ingroup respect were simultaneously entered as 
predictors, the effect of anticipated ingroup respect remained significant (β = .49, p = .01), 
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while the direct effect of Ingroup Norm was no longer reliable (β = .13, p = .497). A Sobel 
test (z = 5.79, p < .001) confirmed that there was a significant indirect effect of ingroup norm 
on bipolar choice of strategy through anticipated ingroup respect, indicating full mediation as 
predicted. 
General Discussion 
 With this research, we connect current insights on moral psychology to existing 
theory and research on group processes and social identity. Previous work on morality has 
primarily examined what people consider to be moral or immoral and how this affects 
individual decision making in moral dilemmas. However, our explicit aim was to focus on the 
social identity implications of moral behavior, and to address the possibility that different 
groups can have different moral norms based on specific values they share, instead of 
examining the effects of universal moral convictions. This enables us to develop novel 
insights both on the effects of group norms in social identity maintenance, and on the social 
implications of shared moral values. 
Contribution and Theoretical Implications 
 The two studies reported here found empirical support for our theoretical analysis 
according to which shared moral values constitute a central aspect of people’s social 
identities. The awareness of what other group members consider moral behavior affected 
people’s willingness to engage in different behavioral strategies, as well as their bipolar 
choice of status improvement strategy. No comparable effect of ingroup norms was found 
when the behavior that was approved by the group was evaluated in terms of competence. 
This was the case despite the fact that the competence norm manipulation was successful and 
effect sizes of the manipulation checks indicated that the participants were equally aware of 
both types of norms.  
 Results of both studies extend previous findings (Ellemers et al., 2008) because they 
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indicate that people see adherence to moral ingroup norms as a way to earn ingroup respect, 
and this is why they are willing to act in accordance with these norms. This turned out to be 
the case regardless of whether individualistic or collectivistic behavior was considered moral 
by the group. This corroborates our reasoning that norm adherence is driven by the awareness 
of moral values that characterize the ingroup, and does not depend on the specific nature of 
the behavior prescribed by these norms. It also enables us to exclude alternative explanations 
in terms of intra-group interdependence or instrumentality of cooperative behavior in 
groups—that tend to be favored in biological and evolutionary accounts of moral behavior.  
 Moral norms expressed by the high status outgroup did not have comparable effects 
on individual behavioral choices. Again, this was the case despite our observation that the 
outgroup norm manipulation was equally effective as the manipulation of the ingroup norm. 
This contributes to existing insights, and substantiates our analysis in terms of social 
identities instead of interdependence concerns. In fact, the null-effect of outgroup norm is 
theoretically meaningful, because in this context the norms of the higher status group indicate 
which behavior is favored by those currently holding superior societal status. One might 
argue that–because of their higher social status–the judgments of this group should be more 
highly valued than ingroup judgments. That is, the high status group ultimately determines 
the chances that any attempts at status improvement undertaken by members of the low status 
group are likely to succeed, for instance because they have to accept upwardly mobile 
individuals in their midst or need to approve broader societal changes. Because the judgments 
of high status group members do matter, if only for instrumental reasons, it is all the more 
meaningful that participants nevertheless preferred to behave in line with salient ingroup 
norms. This illustrates the significance of distinct group identities and the importance of 
ingroup respect. Moreover, previous findings (Leach et al., 2007) indicates that morality is 
fundamental to ingroup identity, irrespective of group status, so we are inclined to believe 
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that there is no reason to expect status to moderate the presented effects, nor that the lack of 
outgroup norm effect is due to higher status group stereotyping principally in terms of 
competence.   
 In sum, when information about moral ingroup and outgroup norms is provided 
simultaneously, people prefer to behave in line with moral ingroup norms, as they consider 
this to be most relevant for the respect they anticipate to receive from other ingroup members. 
This confirms our contention that moral norm adherence is a way to express and enact one’s 
social identity, rather than reflecting a more generic desire to seek moral approval from 
others–even if they have higher status.  
 In this research, different group norms were induced by indicating how others had 
generally evaluated a particular type of strategy for status improvement. The tendency to 
enact these norms was assessed by asking participants to indicate their willingness to engage 
in different specific behaviors that would be in line with these types of strategies. This 
excludes the possibility that participants simply reproduced the norm information that they 
received, because the norm manipulation did not directly map onto the way in which 
participants’ responses were assessed. Furthermore, participants not only opted for strategies 
that were in line with what the group endorsed, but also internalized the further implications 
of the group norm that was provided, as they inferred that other types of strategies would be 
disapproved by the group. Importantly, this was the case both when they indicated their 
choice of strategy on the bipolar measure and when they could freely indicate their 
willingness to engage in each of specific behavioral strategies.  
 Another important feature of this research is that we examined the impact of moral 
judgments on individual behavior, while disentangling this from the specific nature of the 
behavior that was endorsed by moral norms. This extends previous work in which moral 
behavior tends to be equated with cooperation, altruism, or mutual helping. By keeping 
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constant the specific behavioral strategy endorsed by the ingroup while varying the extent to 
which this same behavior was considered moral or immoral by others, we were able to 
demonstrate that the effects observed were caused by the social identity implications of 
enacting moral values shared by the ingroup, and that this did not depend on the type of 
behavior that was approved by these values. 
 Finally, we see the nature of the groups examined (inhabitants of the South vs. North 
of Italy) and the realistic nature of the focal situation (actual differences in employment 
prospects) and the behavioral strategies examined as a strong point of this research. That is, 
we examined existing social categories, and assessed people’s willingness to enact group 
norms despite their prior knowledge of (and their a priori preferences for) these very real and 
consequential ways in which they might try to improve their current standing in society. 
Furthermore, compared to many laboratory simulations, the format and context in which 
participants completed these measures makes it highly unlikely that participants felt directly 
accountable to others for the choices they made. That is, their answers were provided 
anonymously, making it more likely that we assessed their actual desire to enact group 
norms, instead of tapping more superficial or public displays of compliance. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Because our aim was to disentangle different types of norms in order to make a 
theoretical point, the situation we examined may be seen as quite artificial. From an 
experimental point of view, it is important that we succeeded in creating orthogonal norm 
manipulations, as this enables us to draw unambiguous theoretical conclusions. Indeed, the 
manipulation checks confirm that the moral norm manipulation did not spill over into the 
perceived competence of the normative behavior, and that the manipulation of ingroup norm 
did not affect outgroup norm perceptions. However, in more naturally occurring situations it 
is very rare to have available such explicit and complete information about the behavior that 
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is endorsed by different groups, or about specific competence or morality judgments on 
which these norms are based. In the absence of antagonistic intergroup relations people are 
likely to assume that the behavior endorsed by the outgroup might also be valued by the 
ingroup. Likewise, they have no reason to doubt that the behavior that the ingroup approves 
as competent will also be considered moral. Future research might address whether and how 
people actually make such inferences about different aspects of behavioral norms. It might be 
interesting to examine for instance whether knowledge about ingroup norms affects the 
inferences people make about outgroup norms – either in the form of assimilation or contrast 
effects. Future research might also assess whether such effects are moderated by status or 
power differences between the groups. Likewise, it may be worthwhile to learn more about 
the likelihood that people infer morality judgments from information they have about the 
perceived competence of particular behaviors, and vice versa. 
 An important aim of the current research was to examine the psychological process 
underlying the effect of moral ingroup norms on the behavioral choices of individual group 
members. We found converging support for our prediction that anticipated ingroup respect 
plays an important role in this process. However, our mediation hypothesis was not fully 
supported, in that the effect of moral ingroup norms on the willingness to engage in collective 
strategies was only partially mediated in Study 2. We note that a direct effect of the moral 
ingroup norm in addition to the indirect effect we predicted only emerged for one out of three 
dv’s, in one of the two studies conducted. Thus, there is converging support for the predicted 
psychological process across different measures and in different studies. Nevertheless, future 
research might further examine whether alternative or additional considerations play a role 
besides anticipated ingroup respect. 
 Finally, both studies reported here focused on a specific intergroup context, and on 
the choice for different status improvement strategies as the focal behavior addressed by 
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group norms. In the future, it might be of interest to determine whether these effects of moral 
group norms are limited to behavioral choices that directly impact on the group and its 
members, or may also extend to other domains, where individual behavioral choices are less 
likely to reflect upon other members of the group. In a similar vein, because the measure we 
used captured participants’ initial choice of strategy, it might be of interest to explore how 
robust these effects are over time. That is, whether people are also more likely to persist in 
behaviors that are endorsed by moral ingroup norms than in the case of behaviors that are 
approved by other types of norms. 
Conclusion 
 With the present research we connect different theoretical perspectives and research 
traditions, and have gained more insight into when and why moral values are likely to impact 
on the behavior of individual group members. We have found evidence in support of our 
analysis that people are motivated to enact moral values shared by the ingroup because they 
see this as a way to receive or maintain ingroup respect. This has important implications for 
current theories on moral psychology and social identity, and gives rise to several new and 
intriguing questions.   
Moral Group Norms 
 
29 
 
References 
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A. II, Lim, V.K.G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social-
cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral 
identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 123-141. 
Baron, R.M. & Kenny, D.A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182. 
Barreto, M. & Ellemers, N. (2000). You can’t always do what you want: social identity and self-
presentational determinants of the choice to work for a low-status group. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 891-906. 
Bettencourt, B.A. & Hume, D. (1999). The cognitive contents of social-group identity: 
Values, emotions, and relationships. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 113-
121. 
Capozza, D., Bonaldo, E., & Di Maggio, A. (1982). Problems of identity and social conflict: 
Research on ethnic groups in Italy. In H. Tajfel (ed.), Social identity and intergroup 
relations (pp. 299-334).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Cialdini, R.B. & Goldstein, N.J. (2004). Social Influence: Compliance and conformity. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621. 
De Bruin, E.N.M. & Van Lange, P.A.M. (2000). What people look for in others: Influences 
on the perceiver and the perceived on information selection. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 206-219. 
Ellemers, N., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2004). Sources of respect: The effects of being liked by 
ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 155-172.  
Ellemers, N., Pagliaro, S., Barreto, M., & Leach, C.W. (2008). Is it better to be moral than 
smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at 
Moral Group Norms 
 
30 
 
group status improvement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1397-
1410. 
Ellemers, N. & Rink, F. (2005). Identity in work groups: The beneficial and detrimental 
consequences of multiple identities and group norms for collaboration and group 
performance. Advances in Group Processes, 22, 1-41. 
Ferrin, D.L., Kim, P.H., Cooper, C.D., & Dirks, K.T. (2007). Silence speaks volumes: The 
effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial for responding to 
integrity- and competence-based trust violations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 
893–908. 
Fiske, S.T., Cuddy, A.J.C., Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often) mixed stereotype 
content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and 
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878-902. 
Fiske, A.P. & Tetlock, P.E. (1997). Taboo trade-offs: Reactions to transactions that transgress 
the spheres of justice. Political Psychology,18, 255-297. 
Fry, D.P. (2006). Reciprocity: The foundation stone of morality. In: M. Killen, & J.G. 
Smetana (Eds.). Handbook of moral development (pp. 399-422). Mahwah, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D.  (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior. 
Psychological Science, 20, 393-398. 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.  
Haidt, J., Rosenberg, E., & Hom, H. (2003). Differentiating diversity: Moral diversity is not 
like other kinds. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 1-36. 
Huo, Y.J., Smith, H.J., Tyler, T.R, & Lind, E.A. (1996). Superordinate identification, 
subgroup identification, and justice concerns. Is separatism the problem, is 
Moral Group Norms 
 
31 
 
assimilation the answer? Psychological Science, 7, 40-45. 
Jetten, J., Postmes, T., & McAuliffe, B.J. (2002). “We’re all individuals”: Group norms of 
individualism and collectivism, level of identification and identity threat. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 189-207. 
Judd, C.M., James-Hawkins, L., Yzerbyt, V., & Kashima, Y. (2005). Fundamental 
dimensions of social judgment: Understanding the relations between judgments of 
competence and warmth. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 899-913. 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is better 
than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust 
after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 99, 49–65. 
Killen, M., Margie, N.G., & Sinno, S. (2006). Morality in the context of intergroup 
relationships. In: M. Killen, & J.G. Smetana (Eds.). Handbook of moral development 
(pp. 155-183). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Leach, C.W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality 
(vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of ingroups. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 234-249. 
Mullen, E. & Skitka, L.J. (2006). Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral 
mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 629-643. 
Osswald, S., Greitemeyer, T., Fischer, D., & Frey, D. (2010). Moral prototypes and moral 
behavior: Specific effects on emotional precursors of moral behavior and on moral 
behavior by the activation of moral prototypes. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.728. 
Phalett, K. & Poppe, E. (1997). Competence and morality dimensions of national and ethnic 
Moral Group Norms 
 
32 
 
stereotypes: A study in six eastern-European countries. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 27, 703-723. 
Rink, F. & Ellemers, N. (2009). Temporary vs. permanent group membership: How the 
future prospects of newcomers affect newcomer acceptance and newcomer influence. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 764-775.  
Rodriguez Mosquera, P.M., Manstead, A.S.R., Fischer, A.H. (2002). The role of honour 
concerns in emotional reactions to offences. Cognition and Emotion, 16, 143-163. 
Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical 
advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, (Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
Sherif, M. (1966). The psychology of social norms. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Skitka, L.J., Bauman, C.W., & Sargis, E.G. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to 
attitude strength or something more? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
88, 895-917. 
Skitka, L.J. & Mullen, E. (2003). The dark side of moral conviction. Analysis of Social Issues 
and Public Policy, 2 (1), 35-41. 
Skowronski, J.J. & Carlston, D.E. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role of 
cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 52, 689-699. 
Sleebos, E., Ellemers, N., & De Gilder, D. (2006). The carrot and the stick: Affective 
commitment and acceptance anxiety as motives for discretionary group efforts by 
respected and disrespected group members. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 32, 244-255.  
Smith, H.J. & Tyler, T.R. (1997). Choosing the right pond: The impact of group membership 
Moral Group Norms 
 
33 
 
on self-esteem and group-oriented behavior. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 33, 146-170. 
Spears, R., Ellemers, N., & Doosje, B. (2005). Let me count the ways in which I respect thee: 
Does competence compensate or compromise lack of liking from the group? 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 263-280. 
Tafarodi, R.W. & Milne, A.B. (2002). Decomposing Global Self-Esteem. Journal of 
Personality, 70, 443-483. 
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G. Austin 
& S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). 
Monterey, C.A.: Brooks Cole. 
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and conventions. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Turiel, E. (2006). Thought, emotions, and social interactional processes. In: M. Killen, & J.G. 
Smetana (Eds.). Handbook of moral development (pp. 7-35). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum.  
Turner, J.C. (1991). Social influence. Buckingham, U.K.: Open University Press. 
Tyler, T.R. & Lind, A.E. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 115-191. 
Van Lange, P.A.M. & Kuhlman, D.M. (1994). Social value orientations and impressions of a 
partner’s honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 126-141.  
Wainryb, C., Shaw, L.A., Laupa, M., & Smith, K.R. (2001). Children’s, adolescents’ and 
young adults’ thinking about different types of disagreements. Developmental 
Psychology, 37, 373-386. 
Wojciszke, B. (1994). Multiple meanings of behavior: Construing actions in terms of 
Moral Group Norms 
 
34 
 
competence or morality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 222-232. 
Wojciszke, B. (2005). Morality and competence in person- and self-perception. European 
Review of Social Psychology, 16, 155–188. 
 
Moral Group Norms 
 
35 
 
Footnotes 
 
1. The ingroup examined included both participants with relatively low societal status (South 
of Italy) as well as those with a relatively neutral position in society (Middle-South of Italy). 
Thus we conducted additional analyses to ascertain that the effects we found did not depend 
on the status position of participants. These confirmed that our findings are robust across 
these different types of ingroups and participants, and are not specific for groups with low 
societal status. 
 
2. Given the relatively strong relation between the mediator and the dependent variable we 
conducted a PCA, which confirmed that anticipated ingroup respect and the willingness to 
invest in collective strategies can be considered separate constructs, which together account 
for 82% of the variance in the individual items. Additionally, when we examined a reversed 
mediation model, this fits the data less well, as the direct effect of moral norm (IV) on 
anticipated ingroup respect (DV) remained significant after controlling for willingness to 
invest in collective strategies as a potential mediator.   
 
3. Because of the relatively large F-value observed for the two-way interaction, we checked 
whether the main effect of Ingroup Norm emerged in both Outgroup Norm conditions. This 
proved to be the case (both p’s <.001).  
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Appendix A. Manipulation of group norms. 
A previous survey was conducted by the National Institute for Statistics in 2006, in order to 
evaluate and compare the actual occupational possibilities in different areas of Italy. That 
research demonstrated that the economical situational was very different comparing the 
Middle-South and the North of Italy. In particular, that research highlighted that the Middle-
South was drastically disadvantaged, in terms of an higher percentage of precarious workers 
compared to the North (85% vs. 20%), very lower salary (700 € vs. 1,300 €) and triple 
percentage of unemployment (65% vs. 19%). In addition, the survey highlighted how there 
are two different ways to deal with these differences in opportunities. One is to find a way to 
improve one’s personal position or prospects, despite being from the Middle-South. In this 
vein, different possibilities are, for instance, moving to the North; getting a higher level of 
education or finding people who are willing to help a person to get a job, and so on. An 
alternative, is to try to redress this difference in opportunities between people living in the 
Middle-South and in the North. Here too, different courses of action could possible achieve 
this, e.g., becoming politically active, and lobbying for additional government support for the 
Middle-South; setting up a program to facilitate employment in the Middle-South; organizing 
support for people to help each other develop the Middle-South and so on. To summarize, 
that survey classified all the possible courses of action in two different and in a way opposite 
strategies to deal with the disadvantaged situation, namely the strategy activated in order to 
better one’s personal position vs. the strategy activated in order to better the position of the 
Middle-South as a whole. Choosing for a strategy would obviously imply abandoning the 
other. 
[A priori evaluation of individual vs. collective strategies] 
In the 2006 survey, a representative sample of 3000 Southerners have evaluated the strategies 
activated in order to better the position of the Middle-South as better (vs. worse) than the 
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strategies activated in order to better one’s personal position both in terms of morality and 
competence. That is, the strategies aiming at bettering the position of the Middle-South have 
been evaluated as more moral (vs. immoral) and smarter (vs. more stupid) than the strategies 
activated to better one’s personal position. In fact, the majority of interviewed Southerners 
declared that trying to advance the position of one’s group is the more moral (vs. an immoral) 
way to act compared to individual advancement, because the group position improvement 
represents a more appropriate way to ensure just outcomes for everybody (vs. because 
collective level measures are less likely to ensure just outcomes for everybody).  
Moreover, the majority of previously interviewed Southerners declared that trying to advance 
the position of one’s group is a smarter (vs. stupid) strategy than individual position 
improvement because compared to individual advancement, collective position improvement 
is a more efficient way to improve outcomes for several group members at the same time (vs. 
is a less efficient way to improve outcomes for individual group members). 
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Appendix B. Items assessing collective strategies and individual strategies, respectively. 
Collective Strategies 
1. Develop an employment program for the Middle-South; 
2. Create a social network to facilitate employment in the Middle-South; 
3. Becoming politically active; 
4. Develop an employment program that qualifies the Middle-South for support from 
the European Union; 
5. Lobbying for additional government support for the Middle-South; 
6. Participate in a committee investigating the differences in the average salaries 
between North and Middle-South, in order to reduce such differences; 
Individual Strategies: 
1. Move to the North to find a job; 
2. Getting a higher level of education; 
3. Find people who are willing to help you to get a job; 
4. Chose a profession in which there are more work opportunities. 
 
